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Saturday, December 3, 2011

(4) Write a Note

(4) Write a Note
Overview of the CTBT Mr Jean du Preez, Chief, External Relations and International Cooperation, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Lecture Outline
1.Overview of the CTBT and the PrepCom
2.Role of the CTBT in international peace and security
3.Prospects for entry into force and universalisation
4.Discussion
1. OVERVIEW OF THE CTBT AND THE PREPCOM FOR THE CTBTO Why a Test Ban?
●U.S. tested the "Gadget" on July 16, 1945
●2,056 tests worldwide, incl. 116 PNE's
●1 test every 9 days for last 50 years
●Total yield of all atmospheric tests equal to 438 MT, or nearly 30,000 Hiroshima sized bombs
●Testing from 1945 – 1980 equal to a Hiroshima size bomb exploding every 11 hours.
Why a test ban? Scale comparison
Hiroshima
15 kt
U.S. B83 bomb
1200 kt
Soviet Tzar Bomba
50 mt
Chinese DF-5A warhead
4,5 mt
The Nonproliferation Regime’s First Success: The Partial Test Ban Treaty
●1954 – Indian Prime Minister Nehru proposed "standstill agreement"- suspend all testing immediately pending nuclear zero
●Talks aimed at a CTBT begun, fell victim to Cold War politics
●Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 spurred States into action
●1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear explosions except underground, but with no verification
●July 1968: NPT opened for signature.
● CTBT negotiated in Conference on Disarmament (1993-96) as result of Clinton initiative
"longest sought and hardest fought prize in the history of arms control" (Clinton -1996) From a standstill to a comprehensive test ban President Kennedy ratifying the PTBT on 7 October 1963. Prime Minister Nehru CTBT Overview
•UNGA adopts CTBT resolution - signed on 24/9/96
•Basic Provisions: Article I: Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
•Article II: Each State Party, furthermore, undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
CTBT Overview
●Bans ALL nuclear explosions, in any environment
●Effective nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament measure: horizontal and vertical
●Intrusive, non-discriminatory verification system
●Key role in international security architecture
●Signed by 182 States with 155 ratified - not yet in force
PrepCom established in 1997 and based in Vienna
•Promotes the Treaty towards universality and EIF
•Establishes the global verification regime: the International Monitoring System
•Prepares for effective CTBT implementation and for 1st Session of Conference of States Parties
•Meets twice a year (June & Oct/Nov)
•WG A (budgetary and administrative matters) & WG B (verification issues) make proposals & recommendations for consideration and adoption by PrepCom
Preparatory Commission
PTS started its work on 17 March 1997
•Under auspices of Executive Secretary (currently Amb Tibor Tóth) assist PrepCom in establishing a global verification regime and promoting entry into force & universalisation
•Fully operational international organisation – will become "CTBTO Technical Secretariat" upon entry into force
•Divided into 5 main Divisions: IMS, IDC, OSI, LEG/ER & ADMIN
•Staff is multinational – over 260 from more than 70 Signature States
Provisional Technical Secretariat Elements of the CTBT Verification Regime International Monitoring System 377 facilities: seismic, hydro-acoustic, infrasound, radionuclide, noble gas, laboratories IDC&GCI Consultation and Clarification Right to clarify matters indicating possible non-compliance On-Site Inspection Conduct of on-site verification activities Confidence Building Measures Large chemical Explosions: Prevent misinterpretations and calibrate seismic IMS component Nuclear Test Environments Atmospheric Tests
•Infrasound Waves
•Radionuclide Release
Underground Tests
•Seismic Waves
•Possible Radionuclide Release
Underwater Tests
•Hydroacoustic Waves
•Possible Radionuclide Release
International Monitoring System Prospective: 377 Facilities Seismic Primary ArraySeismic Primary 3-comp StationSeismic Auxiliary ArraySeismic Auxiliary 3-comp StationHydroacoustic (hydrophone) StationHydroacoustic (T-phase) StationInfrasound StationRadionuclide StationRadionuclide LabSeismic Lab
Data from Remote Station, to Vienna, to State Signatory
Civil and Scientific Applications of CTBT Verification Technologies
•Earthquakes/Seismicity - Tsunami warning
•Volcano Monitoring
•Radiation studies
-Natural and man-made sources
•Atmospheric studies
Elements of the CTBT Verification Regime: CBMs and OSI Consultation and Clarification Right to clarify matters indicating possible non-compliance On-Site Inspection Conduct of on-site verification activities Confidence Building Measures Large chemical Explosions: Prevent misinterpretations and calibrate seismic IMS component CTBT, Article IV, Paragraph 35 The sole purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator. On-Site Inspections
3. Role of the CTBT in International Peace and Security
1.Reality versus Symbolism
•Bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion
•Backed by robust and effective verification regime
2.Non-discriminatory and legally binding
•binds all States with nuclear weapons
•Based on transparent & democratic verification and enforcement
Role of the CTBT in international Peace & security
3.Limits proliferation of nuclear weapons:
•Horizontal: Limits ability of non-possessors to develop nuclear weapons
•Vertical: Constrains development & qualitative improvement of new & more advanced warheads
•Also contributes to preventing proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge that can be used for nuclear weapons
Role of the CTBT in international Peace & security (cont.)
4.One of the strongest catalysts for nuclear disarmament
•Essential for deeper arms reductions by the largest possessor NWS
•Equally important for multilateral disarmament involving all other nuclear-armed States
•Key practical step as envisaged in Art VI of the NPT, which requires all NPT Parties to undertake "effective measure related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament"
•Embodied as high priority nuclear disarmament step by „95 NPT RevExtConf and 2000 RevCon
•Multilateral verification mechanisms (CTBT and future FM(C)T) paramount to the objectives of a nuclear weapons free world
Role of CTBT in international peace & security (cont)
5.Solidifying the nonproliferation norm:
•CTBT is the last barrier on the road to nuclear weapons capacity
•A test is a test is a test – no "peaceful applications" allowed
•Nuclear test is final "downstream" proof about intentions of a state
•Legal instruments "upstream" of the fuel cycle: NPT, safeguards (including the AP) under increasing pressure
•Resurgence of nuclear energy & number of states capable of mastering nuclear fuel cycle technology
•Differentiation between nuclear energy for peaceful or for weapons purposes more and more political and/or legal rather than technological
Role of the CTBT in international Peace & security (cont.) Countries Possessing or Planning to Develop Nuclear Energy Countries that have an IAEA Additional Protocol in force Countries that have Ratified the CTBT and brought an IAEA Additional Protocol into force Countries Possessing or Developing Nuclear Energy Countries that have Installed IMS Stations
6.Provides an important and powerful confidence building tool for establishment and maintenance of regional security, including establishing new NWFZ
•Essential ingredient of all NWFZs (no nuclear weapons, no fissile material for nuclear weapons, no nuclear tests)
•Important ingredient for ME-NWFZ
•Could be the "glue" for a future Korean Peninsula or East Asian NWFZ
Role of CTBT in international peace & security (cont) CTBT & NWFZs
● Most establish in direct opposition to nuclear testing and several zones served as catalysts for CTBT
● Test ban is common legal requirement of all NWFZs,
● Cover territories of more than 110 countries: Latin America & Caribbean (Tlatelolco) South Pacific (Rarotonga) South East Asia (Bangkok) Africa (Pelindaba) Mongolia Central Asia Antarctic

3. Prospects for entry into force and universalisation Entry Into Force
Art XIV(1):
This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
Annex 2 States:
End game time constraints resulted in "Annex 2 States" requirement
44 States participating in negotiations listed by IAEA with research or nuclear power reactors
So far 41 signed, 35 ratified:
China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel & United States have not yet ratified
DPRK, India & Pakistan have not yet signed
Game Changers:
US and Indonesia "To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." – U.S. President Obama, Prague, April 2009 "We decided there was no point in delaying [ratification]. We do not want our policy to be steered by the US‟decisions. We can move it forward with a note that there must be a move to push the US to ratify……"It is our fervent hope that this further demonstration of our commitment to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda will encourage other countries that have not ratified the Treaty, to do the same." - Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa, NPT RevCon, New York, May 2010 Will the dominoes fall?
•The "push and pull" factor
•Indonesia‟ ratification imminent –
•Could serve to "pull" U.S. & China
•Could "push" non-ratifying ASEAN and other states
•U.S ratification a catalyst for entry into force
•Next on the Prague Agenda
•China to follow, then possible India & Pakistan?
•Israeli ratification could be a game changer in the Middle East?
•Egypt linked to progress on ME-NWFZ and Israel‟ adherence to CSAs
•Opportunity for Iran to further clarify the nature of its nuclear program and enhance role in region,
•DPRK in context of 6 Party Talks on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula
 
•Solidifies the norm – further enhances NPT and NWFZs
•Adds political and moral pressure on remaining Annex 2 states
•Ensures political and technological buy-in
•Strengthens worldwide monitoring system & enhances democratic, multilateral verification and compliance
•Signed by 182 States (out of 195)
•155 States ratified so far (latest ratification: Guinea)
•Getting to 160?
•Several States in process of completing ratification process
Why is universalisation important?
States that have Signed and Ratified the CTBT 2009 UNSC Summit on Nuclear Nonproliferation & Disarmament UNSC res 1887 (24/9/09):
•all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the CTBT, thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date
2010 NPT Review Conference
•CTBT plays prominent role prior to and during the proceedings of the Conference
•enjoyed overwhelming support from the vast majority of delegations
•significance of CTBT in the NPT context highlighted prominently in the Final Document
•States reaffirmed the "vital importance" of CTBT EIF as a "core element" of the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime
•First time that an NPT document (final or draft) recognized the CTBT as a core element of the nonproliferation regime

Secretary -General Ban Ki-moon and Ambassador Libran Cabactulan, President of the 2010 Review Conference
CTBT Ministerial Meeting,
23 October 2010 Ministerial Statement endorsed by over 60 countries
•"We commit ourselves individually and together to make the Treaty a focus of attention at the highest political level and to take measures to facilitate the signature and ratification" Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon:
•"We can no longer wait for the perfect international environment before taking advantage of existing – and potentially short-lived – opportunities"
Article XIV Conferences
•Required to promote EIF
•2009 Article XIV Conference (24/9/2009)
•40 Foreign Ministers among 106 delegations
•Held on the same day as historical UNSC summit
•2011 Article XIV Conference (23/9/2011)
•Held during high-level segment of UNGA General Debate
•UN S-G and many Ministers attended (Co-chaired by Sweden and Mexico)
•Adopted powerful Declaration calling for EIF and Universalization
2011 Article XIV Conference
•Since 2009 Art XIV Conference, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Marshall Islands and Trinidad and Tobago have ratified the CTBT
•UNSG Ban Ki-moon
•"The time for waiting has passed. We must make the most of existing – and potentially short-lived – opportunities.